NOTES

1. Byron L. Sherwin, "Faith as Memory," *Commitment and Commemoration* (Chicago: Exploration Press), 96.
2. Abraham Joshua Heschel, *Man Is Not Alone* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1951), 162–63.
3. Sherwin. For a more thorough discussion of this topic, see his paper: "Temple of Muses, Temple of Moses, or Galleries of Learning—Critical Problems of Jewish Museum Education," presented at CAJM meeting in Chicago, Spertus Institute, 1989.

CONCLUSION

Why Germany Remains Divided[1]

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The mass media in Germany greeted the tenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall in the autumn of 1999 with a wave of reports about the state of the relationship between East and West Germans. Their relationship was at this time entering its tenth year under the common roof of a unified republic. The diagnosis advanced in these reports on East-West relations was—by and large—negative, attesting to an unabated, possibly even increased level of estrangement and incomprehension between the two main parts of the German citizenry. Thematically these reports were echoing, in an almost uncanny manner, a much earlier wave of media coverage that followed on the heels of political unification in October 1990. Then, the freshly unified polity was described for the first time as culturally divided, a division that was aptly captured in the image of the "walls in the minds of people" which had supposedly supplanted the Berlin Wall. If Germany today looks no more integrated than Germany nine years ago, if the division is felt as strongly as ever in spite of a set of federal policies which avow integration as their explicit goal, the question of why this division endures is of central importance. In the following pages, I will outline an answer to this question by showing how the organizational form of unification by accession, cultural differences which have emerged in forty years of life in radically different social systems, the ideological repertoire nourished in decades of Cold War confrontation, and the persisting uncertainties of Germans regarding their own Nazi past interact to produce continuing oppositional identifications between Easterners and Westerners. The linchpin of my argument is that in a situation of highly asymmetrical unification burdens, all of the factors just mentioned dovetail in such a way that the interaction between Easterners and Westerners typically proceeds in ways which lead to a misrecognition of Easterners' subjectivity. This misrecognition explains why Easterners continue to feel a lack of belonging in the unified German polity. The sure signs of this lack in belonging in spite of huge Western income transfers to the East are in turn the reason why Westerners feel that Easterners are ungrateful. I will unfold this argument in three steps: In the first two sections of this essay I will give an account of how the alienation between Easterners and Westerners has come about in the first place. The empirical basis for this part is ethnographic fieldwork I have undertaken in the state police departments of Brandenburg and Berlin between 1994 and 1996. Then, I will discuss why the alienation seems to persist, mostly by reference to the controversy over the future of the Palace of the Republic, East Berlin's former parliament cum sociocultural center. This part relies on ethnographic fieldwork I undertook in the summer of 1999 as well as on an extensive literature search. In conclusion, I will present a couple of suggestions for how the alienation between Easterners and Westerners could be eased.

From Political to Cultural Division[2]

The unification of Germany in 1990 proceeded on the assumption of an essential cultural unity of the German people in East and West. To be more precise: unification was acceptable to people in East and West Germany because the idea of the essential unity of the German people had sufficient resonance to legitimate the organizational form in which unification proceeded. These essentialist presuppositions are visible, for example, in the political rhetoric of the time, which was rife with organicist metaphors of kinship and healing wounds. More importantly, however, they found their most vital expression in the relative speed and form of unification, which proceeded in the historically unique fashion of the voluntary, complete dissolution of one state (the GDR) into the political, legal, and administrative framework of another (the FRG).[3] Conditioned by the political fragmentation of Germany in the nineteenth century, cultural essentialism as the constitutive kernel of the German nation has a long tradition.[4] After the total defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II, West Germany maintained this tradition through a series of legal positions and foreign policy measures that structured the relationship between the two German states between their foundation in 1949 and their unification in 1990. Among the most important ones are: the doctrine of sole representation and consequentially the refusal of the FRG to recognize the GDR diplomatically; the demand for unification of the German people, prominently placed at the beginning of the West German constitution, which also self-confidently asserted that it had been promulgated for the German nation as a whole; finally, the FRG's citizenship law, which accepted only one all-German nationality and thus made it de facto possible for East Germans visiting West Germany to obtain "their" West German passport without any problems.

The essentialist stance of the Federal Republic with regard to Germany as a whole softened during the era of *Ostpolitik*[5] and West Germany's economic and cultural elites found it increasingly chic to stress their elective affinities with like-minded friends in Paris and Milan. Though they seemed to be basically losing interest in the GDR, *Ostpolitik* actually supported sentiments of togetherness between many people in both countries by facilitating millions of contacts between relatives on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Thus, when the Wall fell, Easterners and Westerners did in fact experience for a short moment in time a feeling of real *communitas*. The immediate joy over the demise of a dictatorship and an inhumane border regime seemed to corroborate the idea that the German nation was essentially one at heart and unified in mind. Moreover, as Easterners left the GDR in droves to settle in the FRG, and as election results showed a clear preference for unification by accession, old West German presumptions about being the one Germany seem to have been endorsed after all by the citizens of East Germany.

The demise of the old regime in the GDR and the currency union with West Germany began to create changes in the everyday lives of people in the GDR, which were wanted, even deeply desired. Above all, the availability of Western consumer goods as well as the freedom to travel were cherished additions to the GDR life, made possible by democratization and the availability of hard currency. The full impact and meaning of the unification by accession became palpable only, however, as Eastern lives were rendered increasingly more unpredictable in the aftermath of actual political unification when the political, economic, administrative, and juridical systems of the FRG became effective in the territory of the ex-GDR. Reasonable career expectations, based on established life trajectories, were suddenly invalidated, as many Easterners' professional qualifications became questionable, and labor markets began to work under conditions and according to rules different from anything East Germans had known. Employment itself, seen as a right as well as a duty in the GDR and never of any concern in what used to be a full-employment economy, was suddenly in danger of disappearing, as the East German economy was collapsing at a rapid pace.[6]

More importantly, the sweeping, wholesale adoption of Western institutions firmly established everything Western as a norm to which everything Eastern as deviant from this norm had to aspire. Any encounter with things Western identified Easterners as Easterners, and thus also as wanting and in need of adjustment. This is not only true for working life in now newly reorganized, that is, Westernized organizations but it permeated everyday life down to the consumption of ordinary goods:[7] the exercise of a myriad of everyday practices identified Easterners as deficient performers. Moreover, the increasing intensity of encounters between Easterners and Westerners, their efforts to work together on joint problems, made it patently clear that not only the way in which things are done were different in both countries, but

also the ways in which people thought differed in significant ways. Thus, the essentialist presuppositions of the unification process were debunked as illusions in the daily encounters between Easterners and Westerners, which testified to profound differences in culture.

The Berlin Police, for Example[8]

The fate of East Berlin's former People's Police officers may exemplify what unification meant for many ordinary East Germans.[9] Their experiences can also illustrate why many Easterners still have very ambiguous feelings about their belonging in unified Germany, in spite of the fact that almost nobody would wish for a reinstitution of the GDR. It is one thing to reject the GDR but quite another to identify with the FRG. It is precisely Easterners' continuing reservation of positive feelings towards the FRG, that are at the core of the alienation between Easterners and Westerners. As I will show in this section, the Easterners' reservations have deep roots in the daily encounters with Westerners.

Although both police forces jointly staffed several working committees in summer 1990 to organize unification, at the end of the day, unification was, following the accession model for Germany as a whole, planned and executed unilaterally by the West Berlin Police. Beginning with unification day, all commanding positions in Eastern Berlin were staffed with Western officers, relegating Easterners basically to subaltern functions. In addition, all Easterners were individually reviewed for continued employment in the force. The standards for these reviews were set by Westerners, comparing Easterners to what would be expected of Westerners serving in the same position at the same rank. The Eastern police training was, curriculum hour for curriculum hour, compared to Western police training, and whatever didn't correspond was deemed irrelevant. Moreover, the careers of all officers were scrutinized individually for signs showing an especially strong commitment to the communist regime in East Germany to determine whether continued employment in a "democratic police" was acceptable. As a consequence of this review, all staff officers above the rank of major were dismissed, and all officers who were offered continuing employment were demoted by several ranks. Typically, Eastern officers thus found themselves after unification in the next lower career track (e.g., remaining staff officers became commissioned officers, commissioned officers became ordinary patrolmen). All officers had to undergo extensive retraining and they had to demonstrate their newly acquired knowledge in a reexamination showing that they would be able to interpret and enforce a new body of laws in accordance with the new liberal-democratic order of their new-old country. Finally, in keeping with the idea of producing incentives for Western companies to invest in Eastern Germany, wage rates in the five newly founded states on the territory of the former GDR were kept at 60 percent of Western levels with a gradual adjustment to Western standards. In the Berlin Police this led to the difficult situation that Eastern and Western police officers doing the same job were paid very different salaries.

The transition from the People's Police to the Berlin Police created a considerable amount of role insecurity among Eastern officers. Although Easterners at first expected police work in East and West to be roughly similar, everyday practices diverged significantly due to a very different division of labor in many parts of the police as well as due to a different understanding of the role of the law.[10] In addition to undergoing extensive retraining Easterners had to resolve themselves to accepting their Western colleagues as teachers even if they were much younger and much below the rank that Easterners had achieved in the People's police. Otherwise Easterners were sure to run afoul of their superiors who never failed to remind them in which way their actions were falling short of the Western norm. This of course does not at all mean that Westerners were unwilling to help; quite to the contrary, many Westerners made substantial efforts to help their Eastern colleagues. However, help was always provided according to the Western definition of the situation, that is Easterners were helped in their adjustment to meeting Western standards.

At the same time Westerners did not exactly receive Easterners with open arms.[11] Not only had Eastern and Western officers faced each

other as enemies in decades of Cold War confrontation, but also Westerners typically suspected that their Eastern colleagues were deeply implicated in the old GDR regime. They believed that they were in all likelihood closely affiliated with the Stasi, the secret police of the former East Germany, which had become by that time the scapegoat for everything that was wrong with the GDR. Thus Easterners were looked upon by Westerners with strong moral reservations, which were frequently expressed in identifications between the GDR and Nazi Germany. The similarity between both regimes was for many Westerners evident in the outward similarity between Nazi and GDR institutions, ranging from a single party government and uniformed youth organizations to a goose-stepping military. In this vein, Western police officers also thought to discover reminiscences of Nazi Germany in the habitus of the People's Police, especially in its strict military order and demeanor. For Easterners with their antifascist self-understanding, the identifications between the GDR and Nazi Germany were of course a shocking provocation that they could not swallow easily, and to which they answered in turn by pointing to the continuities in personnel between Nazi Germany and the FRG. Thus, in effect, Eastern and Western officers exchanged once more the maligning rhetoric of the Cold War years, with the difference that the Westerners' position was bolstered now by ever-new revelations about suppressive actions in the former GDR.

Of course, the equation Westerners made between Nazi Germany and the GDR was only the tip of an iceberg of negative identifications of everything Eastern. There was barely any aspect of Eastern life that did escape Western satire and ultimately Western rejection, no matter whether talk turned to architecture, technology, social institutions, attitudes, styles, customs, or habits. For Easterners this was extremely hurtful because they were in part proud of what they considered major achievements of GDR society, especially the progress that had been made in reconstructing the country since the devastation of World War II. They had also lived in a land that had guaranteed work for everyone and had provided comprehensive state-run day care. In the face of this pride in their own achievements, which after all in many ways reflected the stories of their own lives, a particular style of Western denigration proved to be especially difficult to cope with for Easterners. Pointing to a crumbling facade in some Eastern street, Westerners would say, for example, "This looks like the West looked in the 1950s," or they would deride the latest People's Police technology as dernier cri of Western times long since past. The constant belittling of the East by Westerners often took the form of a temporal displacement in the sense that the Eastern present was identified with a Western past of several decades ago. What made this particular Western strategy so effective is that due to Easterners' own (socialist) ideology of progress, which placed a high value on economic and technological improvements, Easterners became unwitting coconspirators in the Westerners' denigration of the East. Easterners, at least at the beginning deeply impressed by Western wealth and Western technology, could not help but to assent to Westerners' judgements.

An especially important aspect of the Westerners' distemporalizing identifications is that they implicitly recommended a clear-cut blueprint of development for Easterners: a repetition, a reliving of Western history, ideally in fast-forward mode. This distemporalization strategy again resonates with an essentialist image produced in the West during the Cold War era that juxtaposed the vast majority of ordinary people in the GDR to the communist rulers and their apparatchiks. While the mass of ordinary people were thought of as being like Westerners, the apparatchiks were believed to keep the ordinary people from becoming "like every other German." Thus Westerners believed that ordinary Easterners had to constantly feign a socialist self behind which they maintained a true self that was much like the self of Westerners.

Although this presupposition of a shared cultural identity might have been true in the 1950s it certainly no longer held at the beginning of the 1990s. Forty years of life in different social, economic, and political systems, forty years of participation in a different set of discourses has indeed created distinctly different cultures in East and West Germany irrespective of the political allegiance of the people in question.[12] I can only hint at these differences here by sketching out two

examples. Eastern and Western police officers mutually accused each other of not exhibiting the right attitude to work. As I started to analyze in which contexts and according to which criteria Easterners and Westerners identified each other as lacking a proper work ethic, I started to see that each side was operating with a different notion of time underpinning its evaluations. Westerners were using a notion of intensive time, which means that they praised those who performed work that was done well within as small a time span as possible. Easterners by contrast were using a notion of extensive time, which means that they praised those officers as good workers who demonstrated what was often referred to as "commitment." Commitment was shown in turn by accepting overtime work without complaint. It is particularly interesting that these uses of different criteria for assessing the morality of work performances resonate with fundamental organizational principles of capitalist and socialist economies.

Other cultural differences transpire from an analysis of the moral evaluations of the GDR, which were a constant sore point between Easterners and Westerners. Conversations about the wall and the Stasi have revealed interesting differences in the structure of moral reasoning between Easterners and Westerners. The core difference I observed between Easterners and Westerners was that Westerners made extensive use of a framework of individual rights, a strategy of assessment, which was almost completely absent from the deliberations of Easterners. Instead, Easterners used almost exclusively a sincerity framework for their moral evaluations of self, other, institutions, and the state. These differences in moral vocabulary had considerable consequences for the ability of Eastern and Western officers to morally judge the polity in which they had grown up. The rights framework, because it is organized in form of a catalogue, enabled Westerners to maintain a core identification with their state while critically evaluating parts of it. Easterners were, in the absence of a framework of individual rights, frequently thrown into the dilemma of either accepting the state or rejecting it.[13] Needless to say, such a dilemma is particularly hard to bear for a police officer. Cultural differences such as these fundamental disagreements about the proper ways to evaluate life do of course lead to many misunderstandings. They too greatly facilitate the erection of group boundaries between Easterners and Westerners, as everybody tries to find support among those who share a similar way of looking and judging.

A couple of numbers may also help to illustrate the situation of former People's Police officers. Of the 10,775 People's Police employees taken over by the (West) Berlin Police on October 3, 1990, a mere 5,115 were still employed by the department in summer 1995. In this time span about 900 of these officers left due to early retirement, and roughly 500 were dismissed for ties to the Stasi. It is hard to know what motivated the others, a staggering 40 percent of the initial group, to leave the police service. Some may have departed because they did not want to work for their former enemy; others might have been tired of police work; many might have dreaded the idea of having to go back to school; yet another group might have thought that they would not have much of a career prospect in the newly unified police anyway.

Although the experience of Berlin's former People's Police officers is in many ways unique, many features of their postunification life stories strike me as rather typical for the experience of the GDR population as a whole. There are the constant identifications of Easterners as Easterners, deeply inscribed in everyday life. There are the never-ending identifications of everything Eastern as either irrelevant, or negligible, backward, inferior, or morally dubious, identifications which are particularly hard to accept in their massive totalizing fashion if one has lived a significant portion of one's life in the GDR.

The Palace of the Republic

The everyday debates among Eastern and Western police officers not only reveal underlying thought patterns, they also simultaneously show how Easterners and Westerners understand and treat each other. Major public debates can serve a similar diagnostic function. Since unification by accession precluded a significant debate about the meaning of the

unified German polity in the form of a public discourse about possible constitutional changes, the refashioning of one of its designated symbols, the capital city of Berlin, provides an ersatz forum in which important issues of political orientation can be raised. While the arguments over the Reichstag and the Holocaust Memorial principally raised issues of present-day Germany's relation to its own Nazi past, the debate about the future of the Palace of the Republic (henceforth "Palace") highlights the still problematic understanding between Easterners and Westerners. There are two parties to the dispute. One group advocates the preservation of the Palace in one form or another; the other group wants it torn down to make way for a reconstruction of the Hohenzollern Castle (henceforth "Castle"), which once stood where the Palace stands today. Although the fault lines in the debate about the future of the Palace are not entirely congruent with the East-West division, the support for the preservation of the Palace is predominantly based in the East, while the support for the reconstruction of the Castle is mostly a Western affair.[14]

The arguments of either side can be fully understood only by appreciating the history of the location for which a preserved Palace and a reconstructed Castle compete. The basic elements of the historical narrative are uncontroversial, which is the reason why it is possible to tell it first without direct reference to either party.[15] Located on an island created by the Spree river, sandwiched between the historical locations of the two founding communities of present-day Berlin, the medieval towns of Berlin and Cölln, the contested space can be considered the very center of historical Berlin. In the fourteenth century the Hohenzollerns made use of this strategic location from which they could easily control both towns by building their first Castle there. Changes in military technology and the relative success of the Hohenzollerns prompted a first complete remodeling of the Castle in the Renaissance. During Brandenburg-Prussia's rapid ascent to great power status in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Hohenzollerns aimed to express their freshly gained position in the European order of states by launching a series of ambitious construction projects that eventually transformed the small, insignificant town of Berlin/Cölln into a respectable capital city. At the very beginning of this building boom, just in time to mark the newfound dignity of the Hohenzollerns as "kings in Prussia," there was another reconstruction and sizable expansion of their Castle. All the other buildings that today form the emblematic center of the city (the Brandenburg Gate, the museums, today's Humboldt University, etc.) were built after the Castle was reinvented in high Baroque style as a royal residence. Except for some minor additions and changes, including the erection of a dome above the main gate, the exterior of the Castle remained basically unaltered for the next 250 years. During the revolution of 1919, Karl Liebknecht, coleader of Germany's communist party, made an ill-fated attempt to proclaim a socialist German republic from one of the Castle's windows. During the Weimar Republic and the subsequent Nazi dictatorship the Castle was used as a public museum.

At the end of World War II, Berlin's city center, including the Castle and most of the other architectural showpieces in its vicinity, lay in ruins. Alas, unlike the other buildings representing Prussia's splendor, which were one by one carefully reconstructed by the GDR, the ruins of the Castle itself were blown up in 1950 in spite of a wave of protests from within and outside of East Germany. In addition to shying away from the enormous cost of the Castle's reconstruction, the GDR government apparently intended to leave a socialist imprint on Berlin's cityscape, and the Castle clearly stood in the way of these plans. For many years, the GDR did not have the economic wherewithal to do anything with the vast space emptied by the destruction of the Castle other than to use it for mass demonstrations. Later plans to build a central government building at this site failed to materialize both for lack of a convincing design that did not smack of Stalinist grandiosity as well as for want of funding.[16] When Erich Honecker succeeded Ulbricht in the early seventies, the need to find a new abode for East Germany's parliament was combined with the idea to build a sociocultural center (*Kulturhaus*) right in the middle of Berlin. Planning for this project to build a "Palace of the Republic" in the high modernist

style of the time began in 1973. In 1976 the Palace was opened, housing a multiplicity of performance spaces, including a technologically unique "Grand Hall," several restaurants, a youth club and bowling alleys under the same roof as the plenary hall of the parliament, which, since it was so rarely in session, was mostly used as a convention facility. Between its opening and its closure the Palace received 70,000 visits; it housed 20,000 different events ranging from Communist Party congresses to dance performances, symphony concerts, jazz sessions, cabaret evenings, and balls. In late summer 1990, the first freely elected parliament of the GDR decided to close the Palace due to asbestos poisoning. After having sold off all of the Palace's interior furnishings and putting a complete stop to all maintenance activities, the government decided to go ahead with radical asbestos removal, which will basically strip the interior of the Palace to its bare concrete and steel skeleton.

The core arguments advanced by the proponents of the reconstruction of the Castle are framed aesthetically and symbolically. Key to the argument of the Castle supporters is the fact that the emblematic center of Berlin was built after the Castle with a clear orientation toward the Castle. Thus, the Castle and its surrounding buildings form in their view an organic whole, a historical ensemble, which would remain essentially incomplete without rebuilding the Castle with at least its original facade and in its traditional proportions. Those who support the castle project often describe present-day vistas that include the Palace as disturbing the sense of balance and beauty that the original ensemble had achieved. Thus, it is argued for example that a walk from the Brandenburg Gate toward the Spree island ends today in the void of the square in front of the Palace; whole dimensions are perceived as too small and stylistically too much out of place to provide an aesthetically pleasing frame.

Interviews with proponents of the Castle's reconstruction show, however, that the aesthetic argument is intricately connected with other thoughts and feelings. There is most notably the craving for a center. On one level this is simply the longing for a beautiful inner city that will provide an orientation for Berlin's haphazard agglomeration of subcenters. This craving is particularly pronounced among West Berliners who were deprived of easy access to the center during the division of the city. Not surprisingly, then, Westerners' involvement in preservation and reconstruction projects in the district of Mitte (center) are in part also a way of repossessing the historical core of the city. The constant references to the city's center as "the living room of Berlin" *(die gute Stube Berlins)* make clear how these Westerners experience GDR buildings often as the illegitimate leftovers of an unwanted intruder.[17] Their scorn for GDR architecture is particularly pronounced with regard to the Palace, which is seen as the illegitimate consequence of the "cultural barbarism" of blowing up the Hohenzollern Castle.

On another level, however, the craving for a beautiful historical center is also the longing for an admirable tradition that can serve as an anchor for collective identities. Many proponents of a Castle reconstruction find such anchors embodied in the magnificent centers of other European capitals—most notably Paris, Rome, and London—and they wish very much that Berlin would be more like these cities in rendering the cultural achievements of their nation sensuously accessible in its marvelous architecture. Encapsulated in this craving for an admirable tradition is a rejection of the international style of architecture, which for many supporters of the Castle is the antithesis of an identity-generating form of spatial expression. To them, modern architecture is fungible and faceless, unable to grasp what is specific to Berlin, specific to Germany. This rejection of aesthetic modernism can, however, not be fully understood without seeing what aesthetic modernism meant in the lives of many Westerners. Amidst the debris of World War II, in face of the horrors of the Holocaust, aesthetic modernism seems to have had for many Castle advocates the lure of a clean, fresh beginning. Alas, the fiction of a clean slate came at least partially at the price of a wholesale rejection of tradition. While explaining how they have come to advocate for the Castle's reconstruction, they describe how the devastation of World War II and the guilt over Nazi

atrocities had led them in the 1950s and 1960s to reject traditional forms in favor of modern ones. Modern architecture, Castle advocates argue today, has amplified the devastation that World War II wrought on Germany's cityscapes: the tales of the community, the continuity of its history are no longer visible to the flaneur. By reconstructing the Castle they hope to correct what appears to them now as the "sins of their youth," thus helping to bring Berlin and Germany back in touch with their own positive tradition, a tradition unscathed by World War II and the Holocaust.

The arguments of the Castle proponents are cast from a Western perspective, from Westerners' experiences of history, and with Western values in mind. The biographies of East Germans and the history of the GDR are a disturbing, annoying aside in the visions of Western Castle proponents for a renewed city center. Thus, Easterners' activities supporting preservation of the Palace of the Republic are quickly written off as GDR nostalgia, or worse, as the untenable ideological commitments of people incorrigibly devoted to a dictatorial regime.[18] Many East Berliners do indeed have tender feelings for the Palace, based in fond memories of the times they spent there attending performances, celebrating a "round" birthday with friends, or taking part in the many educational events sponsored by the Palace.[19] Thus, the Palace evokes many positive associations, rendering the building a physical anchor for the good memories of the GDR past.

The Palace with its many offerings, with its open hallways freely accessible to anybody anytime, was entirely unique in East Berlin, and it is probably fair to say that the Palace was East Berlin's social center, the closest thing East Germany ever had to an Italian piazza. This is not to deny, of course, that this space was closely controlled by the state, that everything that ever happened there was carefully censored; but it is probably also true that it is the space where the state was willing to cater most visibly to the tastes of its citizens. Thus, many older East Berliners feel that their life stories are closely connected with the Palace, and it is also by virtue of the Palace's function as anchor for positive memories that they would hate to see it destroyed. As this is not the rejection of the present in favor of an idealized past, it can hardly be called nostalgia. Rather it is the Easterners' desire to see their identities rooted in the spatial arrangements in which they live. As such it is the flip side of Westerners' desire to see themselves reflected in Eastern spaces by removing to the degree possible reminiscences of the GDR past.

Easterners' argument for the preservation of the Palace has a range of additional dimensions that warrant consideration. For many of them the Palace was one of the most important examples of public property, and they feel that the Palace was theirs, in part because of the sacrifices they made for its construction (for example, by accepting delays in the execution of public housing programs caused by the Palace). They also feel that the Palace, especially the multifunctionality of its Grand Hall—designed to adjust to various audience sizes, while minimizing the distance between viewer and stage—was a real technological accomplishment, one that still evokes a sense of pride in them. Unlike the Eastern police officers' comparison between People's Police and Berlin Police technology, Palace proponents' comparison between the Palace's Grand Hall and all other comparable halls in Berlin decisively comes down in favor of the Palace. Here they see proof yet again that Westerners are absolutely unable to look with an open mind toward Eastern accomplishments, exhibiting a readiness to destroy anything Eastern simply for the fact of its being Eastern. In this way, the debate about the future of the Palace has for many of them become a symbol of the way in which they see themselves treated within unified Germany.

In contrast to the aesthetically centered argument of the Castle proponents, Palace advocates are primarily concerned with the use of the location and the building. Above all, argue Palace proponents, Berlin's center must be kept open and accessible, it must remain a true public space, one that remains inviting to all—whatever their tastes or economic standing—a place where it is possible for anybody and everybody to meet. They think it would be a real setback if commercial or governmental interests reigned at a location that has provided

them with such a sense of belonging. This is all the more important since many East Berliners feel already priced out of the center of the city. They acutely feel that the posh shops springing up along Friedrichstraße as well as the chic new restaurants and cafés are not for them, but rather for affluent Westerners; that the price levels they can no longer afford are intentionally employed to create social differentiation. Thus they are especially wary of the Castle proponents' general approach, which takes departure from the facade of the building while short shrifting questions of use and accessibility. Since the government has flatly refused to dedicate federal funds to a reconstruction of the Castle, private investors would have to be won over in order to launch the project. Private investors, however, reason the Palace supporters, would need a sizable return on their investment, which is only attainable by privatizing the use of the building to a considerable extent. Accordingly they tend to reject utilization proposals centering on conference facilities and a hotel.

Especially younger Palace advocates, who participate in the battle not for the building itself but mainly for the use of the space, are struck by the lack of ideas for a visionary use of Berlin's most hotly contested piece of land in the plans proposed by the Castle supporters. In clear distinction from these proposals, many of them see in the tradition of the *Kulturhaus*—a type of sociocultural center[20] with roots in Germany's labor movement—a platform that could be used to reinvent a reopened, possibly reconfigured Palace. This would be Berlin's version of the Centre Pompidou and could become a significant site for the exchange of ideas, a site worthy of occupying the center of the city.

In the controversy over the future of the Palace of the Republic, as in the daily interactions of Eastern and Western police, different ways of analyzing problems, different styles of thinking driven by different value hierarchies reveal cultural differences between East and West. One can see that a primary concern for the use of space contrasts with a preoccupation over its aesthetic appearance; a strong sense of public property compares with a search for private investment models. Where Palace and Castle proponents concur, however, is in their desire to belong in the center of Berlin. Alas, their different cultures and different histories create very different understandings of how this belonging should find physical representation.

For an understanding of the sources of alienation between Easterners and Westerners, the ways in which the contending parties take note of each other are particularly interesting. If both sides of the debate are asked to portray each other it quickly becomes clear that Palace supporters typically know much more about the arguments of Castle proponents than the other way around. There are probably two main causes for this asymmetry. Castle proponents, embedded in the political structures and journalistic networks of West Germany, have a much easier time ensuring that their message gets heard both by the people who matter in political decision making as well as by the mass of the population. Thus, the Castle proponents have succeeded in inserting their ideas about the future of the contested Spree island location into the official government-sponsored permanent exhibition on the future of Berlin. Their project is presented there right next to the approved models and plans for the reconstruction of government buildings, thus giving the Castle reconstruction the aura of an officially decided, already approved project. This asymmetry in the access to power also makes clear why the Palace proponents need to know more about the Castle proponents than the other way around: if they want to be effective, they have to maneuver in a world informed by the cultural presuppositions shared between Castle proponents and the powers that be. In other words, they have to play according to Western rules in a Western game, which is not traditionally theirs.[21]

Conclusions

The two case studies of East-West encounters analyzed in this paper, the unification and work-life of the Berlin Police, as well as the public debate about the future of the Palace of the Republic, provide a window into the causes of persisting oppositional identifications between Easterners and Westerners. The common thread that runs through both

cases is this: Unification by accession has solidified and in part even sanctified Western Cold War understandings of the GDR and its inhabitants. Even more importantly, unification by accession has turned all East-West encounters into interactions that proceed according to Western rules and Western standards. Easterners are thus not only permanently identified as Easterners, but worse, they are in Westerners' eyes identified as deficient performers in need of adjustment. Through unification by accession Westerners have attained a structural and ideological position that exerts little pressure on them to think about Easterners as equal partners with a different history and with a different culture. While Easterners are forced by the same structural conditions to make a serious attempt to understand Western ways, Westerners' empathy for Easterners is hampered by the attribution of moral guilt to Easterners for their silent toleration if not active support for a dictatorship. This is read by Westerners into every Eastern defense or praise of the GDR. The emotional force of these moral attributions is only comprehensible in terms of Westerners' own insecurities about the degree to which they have come to terms with the specters of Germany's Nazi past. This dovetailing of traditions, ideologies, anxieties, and structural conditions has lead to a situation in which Westerners, including the political elites and the FRG state bureaucracy, constantly fail to recognize the full subjectivity of Easterners. In the language of the theory of dialogue[22] one would have to say that Westerners, and formerly Western and now all-German institutions, fail to treat Easterners as equal partners in dialogue in a situation that might be characterized as one of structural misrecognition.

This aggravation of the already enormous task of adjusting to a completely new world has hurled Easterners into painful status inconsistencies and uncertainties. Such persistent misrecognition makes it hard for Easterners to feel at home in the FRG even though most of them have attained a standard of living they could have only dreamt of in the GDR. Since this enormous surge in the standard of living in Eastern Germany is unthinkable without the large transfers from West to East, Westerners expect gratitude, which they want to see in

Easterners' expressions of happiness as citizens of the FRG. Alas, although unification was materially a success it has created many serious problems for Easterners. Thus, they wonder what precisely it is that they ought to be grateful for. Moreover, gratitude is hard to show in a situation of asymmetry of power and wealth and it is tantamount to self-depreciation in a situation of misrecognition.

Germany will remain divided as long as East Germans are not treated by West Germans as equal partners in dialogue. In other words Germany will remain divided as long as West Germans are unwilling to accept Easterners as equal partners on the basis of their full subjectivity rather than by virtue of their assimilation to Western standards. This must include a recognition by Westerners that Easterners are different, that forty years of life under very different circumstances have created appreciably different habits, different ways of approaching problems, other ways of thinking. This also includes a recognition that Easterners have their own history irrespective of how much this history is fraught with the active maintenance and passive toleration of a dictatorial regime. Thus, this history must not be looked at by Westerners as if it were best forgotten; rather, it needs to be incorporated into a public, plural vision of what it means to be a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The task of dialogue, the task of accepting the full subjectivity of the other, is closely tied to the ability to listen, and to be in the end ready to change in the encounter with the other. In addition, it is particularly this listening and the readiness to change through the touch of the other that has been continuously missing in East-West encounters. Unification by accession would not have had the divisive effect of normalizing everything Western while measuring everything Eastern as deviant from it if only Westerners had been graced with more substantial amounts of modesty, if they had been more prepared to recognize the shortcomings of their own system. Such modesty might have driven them to listen more closely to Easterners who, as keen observers of this new system, raise interesting, substantive questions about its nature, thus exposing some of the self-contentedness of the Western society, economy, and polity. It is smug, for example, to brush aside Easterners' questions regarding the freedom of speech at the workplace; it is self-righteous to slight their bewilderment over Western pressures to find market-driven solutions for the center of Berlin. Easterners' puzzlement over many aspects of the Western system could be used as a starting point to think seriously about democratic reforms. This potential for reform in a dialogue between East and West, a dialogue that must encompass a serious reflection about Germany's two dictatorships while avoiding self-congratulatory attributions of guilt, could indeed provide valuable impulses for reinvigorating the democratic process in Germany.

NOTES

1. The research for the first two sections of this paper was made possible by a much-appreciated grant from the Program for the Study of Germany and Europe, Center for European Studies, Harvard University.

2. For a much fuller treatment of the argument presented in the following two sections please see Andreas Glaeser, *Divided in Unity: Identity, Germany, and the Berlin Police* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). Based on extensive ethnographic fieldwork in the Berlin and Brandenburg police departments, this volume systematically explores the cultural differences between East and West Germans, while tracing East-West boundary building through policy decisions and everyday life with the help of a hermeneutic theory of identity construction.

3. The alternative path to unification, the election of a joint constitutional assembly, was soundly defeated in the first free East German elections of March 18, 1990, when conservative parties advocating unification by accession prevailed over the Social Democrats and the civil rights movement in the GDR who favored reconstitution.

4. See for example Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), and Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

5. See for example Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York: Vintage, 1993).

6. Even with the help of extensive government-subsidized employment programs, the unemployment rates in East Germany soared to well above 15 percent, reaching much higher rates in particularly hard-hit areas. For a recent assessment of the economic consequences of unification see Charles Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of the GDR* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

7. Compare especially Glaeser, *Divided in Unity,* on work, and Daphne Berdahl, *Where the World Ended: Re-Unification and Identity in the German Borderland* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

8. The Berlin Police was chosen as a fieldsite to study processes of identity construction between East and West Germans mainly because the Berlin Police is one of the few organizations in unified Germany where East and West Germans collaborate not only vertically but, due to the extensive mixing of officers, also horizontally within the same organizational hierarchy.

9. Although what follows pertains exclusively to the Berlin Police as far as the precise procedure is concerned, the magnitude of change, the upheaval in life experienced is not untypical for what happened to many East Germans. In many ways, the public sector employees were even privileged, because their risk at becoming unemployed was much lower than the risk faced by employees of what would become the private sector in East Germany.

10. With a few exceptions, Western policing affords the individual officer with much more independence. In addition, in spite of superficial similarities, socialist understandings of law are fundamentally different from liberal interpretations of law in that the former emphasizes substantive rationality while the latter stresses procedural (formal) rationality.

11. Of course, Easterners had reservations against Westerners as well. Alas, given the institutional structure of the situation their reservations were not backed by institutional power, rendering their reservations more into a "take it or leave it" choice.

12. Members of the GDR opposition were deeply formed by this culture too. Thus, sympathizers and opponents of the GDR regime frequently share their sense of frustration produced by encounters with Westerners.

13. The reliance on sincerity as key moral value has thrown People's Police officers into a serious double-bind situation, because their own personal desires (e.g., to meet Western relatives, or to watch Western television) clashed in significant ways with their commitment to their roles as police officers (who were as such forbidden to meet Western relatives and to watch Western television). For a detailed analysis of this problem see the chapters "Challenging Sincerity" and "Individual Rights and the Morality of States" in Glaeser, op. cit.

14. Some former members of the civil rights movement in the GDR have become advocates for a reconstruction of the Castle; some Western intellectuals and art historians arguing from the perspective of monument preservation abhor the idea of a reconstructed Castle, favoring instead a preservation of the Palace as an authentic monument.

15. My most important source for the history of the Hohenzollern Castle is Goerd Peschken and Hans-Werner Klünner, *Das Berliner Schloß* (Frankfurt am Main: Propyläen, 1982), as well as Renate Patras, *Das Berliner Schloß von 1918 bis 1950* (Berlin: Verlag für Bauwesen, 1992). The sources for the history and activities at the Palace of the Republic are Heinz Graffunder, *Der Palast der Republik* (Leipzig: Seemann, 1977); Bruno Flierl, "Das Kulturhaus in der DDR," in *Städtebau und Staatsbau im 20. Jahrhundert,* ed. Gabi Dolff-Bonekämper and Hiltrud Kier (München: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 1996); and Heinz Günter Behnert, *Palast, Palazzo: 1973 | 1997* (Berlin: edition bodoni, 1997).

16. See on this point also Bruno Flierl, "Der Staat in der Mitte Berlins," in Architektenkammer Berlin, *Architektur in Berlin: Jahrbuch 1993/1994* (Berlin: 1994).

17. Similar reactions are typical also for people born in some East German towns, who fled the GDR early on, and who now find any kind of changes in the cityscape effected during GDR times highly disturbing, as the unfamiliar construction undermines their feelings of belonging.

18. This reproach again resonates with that leveled against incorrigible Nazis in the debate about the proper consequences to be drawn from Germany's Nazi past.

19. See also Kirstin Heidler, ed., *Von Erich's Lampenladen zur Asbestruine: Alles über den Palast der Republik* (Berlin: Argon, 1998), and Behnert, *Palast, Palazzo*.

20. For a history of the *Kulturhaus* tradition in the GDR see Simone Hain, *Die Salons der Sozialisten: Kulturhäuser in der DDR* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 1996), and Bruno Flierl, "Das Kulturhaus in der DDR," in

Städtebau und Staatsbau im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Dolff-Bonekämper and Kier.

21. The organizational form of both groups is telling in this regard. While Castle proponents are organized in one registered association with tax deduction privileges, the support for the Palace is fragmented into at least four different groups, none of which are legally registered, and thus none of which are eligible for tax deduction privileges.

22. Understood here in the tradition of Martin Buber, *Ich und Du* (Stuttgart: Philip Reclam jun., 1995); Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, ed. and trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); and Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*, Ergänzungsband (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1990).